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Abstract. A non-malleable code is an unkeyed randomized encoding scheme that
offers the strong guarantee that decoding a tampered codeword either results in the
original message, or in an unrelated message. We consider the simplest possible
construction in the computational split-state model, which simply encodes a message
m as k|| Ek(m) for a uniformly random key k, where E is a block cipher. This
construction is comparable to, but greatly simplifies over, the one of Kiayias et al.
(ACM CCS 2016), who eschewed this simple scheme in fear of related-key attacks
on E . In this work, we prove this construction to be a strong non-malleable code as
long as E is (i) a pseudorandom permutation under leakage and (ii) related-key secure
with respect to an arbitrary but fixed key relation. Both properties are believed to
hold for “good” block ciphers, such as AES-128, making this non-malleable code very
efficient with short codewords of length |m|+ 2τ (where τ is the security parameter,
e.g., 128 bits), without significant security penalty.
Keywords: Non-malleable code, split-state tampering model, related-key security,
block cipher.
1 Introduction
1.1 Non-Malleable Codes
Non-malleable codes (NMCs) were introduced by Dziembowski, Pietrzak and Wichs in
2010 [DPW10]. They allow the encoding and decoding of messages in such a way that
decoding a tampered (modified) codeword results in a message that is either the one that
was originally encoded, or one uncorrelated with it. NMCs offer a very different perspective
from classical error-correcting codes: when correction is not possible, decoding is required
to fail catastrophically, outputting an unrelated message and not, e.g., one that is close to
the original in terms of some metric. While this is a very strong, potentially hard to fulfill
condition, there is on the other hand no particular requirement that an NMC should be
able to detect an error even on a single bit of a codeword; NMCs can thus in principle be
designed for error patterns for which there can be no classical code, such as ones allowing
to arbitrarily rewrite the entire codeword.
In a slightly more formal way, an NMC is a randomized mapping Enc from a message
space to a codeword space such that (i) there is an efficient (possibly deterministic)
decoding procedure Dec such that Dec(Enc(m)) = m for every message m with probability
1, and (ii) decoding a tampered codeword cˆ := T(Enc(m)) for a function T yields either
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m itself or a message mˆ := Dec(cˆ) that is uncorrelated with m. Although NMCs can be
designed for very powerful error patterns, some restrictions on the set of allowed tampering
functions are still necessary: indeed, it is clear that if c := Enc(m) is for instance tampered
with the function T : x 7→ Enc(Dec(x) + 1) with a fixed choice for the randomness of
Enc, we get that Dec(cˆ) = m+ 1, which is strongly correlated with m. A common and
well-accepted restriction for the allowed set of tampering functions is to restrict to bipartite
functions T = (TL,TR), which act independently on two distinct parts of the encoding, i.e.,
which act as T(c) = TL(cL)||TR(cR) given that c is of the form cL‖cR. When restricting
the class of tampering functions to such bipartite (or, more generally, to multi-partite)
functions, which act independently on different parts of the encoding, one typically speaks
of split-state NMCs. In the extreme case of functions that must act independently on every
bit of the encoding, this recovers the notion of bitwise independent tampering as originally
introduced by Dziembowski et al. [DPW10].
In this work, as we explain in more detail further below, we consider a very simple
split-state NMC construction that is purely based on a symmetric-key primitive (namely
a block cipher). We then rigorously study its security by reducing it to different notions
from the symmetric-cryptography realm.
1.2 NMCs and Tamper-Resilient Cryptography
In typical security analyses in theoretical cryptography, the algorithm under consideration
is modeled as a black-box with which a potential attacker can interact only via the system’s
input- and output-interface. This idealistic approach leads to very nice results, but it is
well understood that it does not capture reality very well. Indeed, its limitations have
been impressively demonstrated by innumerable side-channel and fault attacks on real-life
implementations of various cryptographic schemes.
One possible approach to address physical attacks is to actively protect the implemen-
tation of a scheme in a way that prevents the attacks or makes them too expensive to
carry out, so that an algorithm hopefully does behave like a black box from the attacker’s
perspective. Another approach is to give up on the “black-box model” and allow the at-
tacker some (limited) access to and/or some control over the internal state of an execution,
and come up with new schemes that can then be proven secure in this new model. This
approach is referred to as leakage- or tamper-resilient cryptography, when it aims to protect
against side-channel or fault attacks respectively.
Whichever path is taken, one cannot expect the countermeasures to be universally
effective in any scenario; for fault attacks, any countermeasure is designed with respect to
a certain fault model, which specifies the type of fault (e.g., transient or permanent, bit
flips, random or to a constant), its granularity (e.g., on a bit or on a byte), and the time
and location where it occurs (e.g., on an intermediate variable while performing a specific
computation or on a long-term secret stored in memory). For instance, some fault attacks
on the AES have been using faulty computations [BS03, PQ03], while some attacks on RSA
signatures rely on faulting a secret or public parameter stored in memory [BNNT11, BM16].
One of the core tools for designing tamper-resilient cryptographic schemes are NMCs.
This should not come as a surprise given their functionality: if we for instance envision
the secret key of a cryptographic algorithm to be NMC-encoded, then any tampering (to
which the NMC is resistant) will either not affect the decoded secret at all, in which case
“black-box” arguments are enough to guarantee security; or it will make it unrelated to the
original value, in which case the output of the algorithm cannot be used by an adversary
to learn anything meaningful. This property makes NMCs directly applicable to protect
against fault attacks on long-term parameters stored in memory, such as the ones of Brier
et al. [BNNT11] and Bhattacharya and Mukhopadhyay [BM16]. We refer to [DPW10] for
the details on how to generically use NMCs to protect against this kind of attacks that
exploit a tamper-prone memory, assuming tamper- and leakage-proof computation.
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In contrast, attacks that exploit faulty computations, such as the ones of Blomer and
Seifert [BS03] and Piret and Quisquater [PQ03], are harder to deal with and NMCs do
not offer an immediate solution; additional (or different) techniques are then necessary to
achieve tamper-resilience. It is worth noticing that some proposed ad hoc countermeasures
against faulty computations do bear some resemblance with NMCs. This is the case of
infective countermeasures, some of which have been proposed to protect the AES [LRT12,
GST12, TBM14] (although with mixed results, as these have all been attacked in various
fault models [BG13, TBM14, BG16]). These countermeasures typically work by interleaving
(in a secret way) the rounds of a real AES computation with ones performed on dummy
states for which faults are easy to detect. If a fault is detected, a dummy ciphertext is
released instead of the original one, preventing the leakage of any information about the
real key.
Beyond their application to tamper-resilient cryptography, NMCs have been proven
to be useful in various other contexts as well. For instance, Coretti et al. showed how
NMCs can be used to extend single-bit public-key encryption schemes to multiple-bit
ones [CMTV15]. Agrawal et al. achieved a similar goal in the context of non-malleable
commitments, building a multi-bit commitment from a single-bit one [AGM+15], whereas
Goyal et al. demonstrated how to use NMCs in the split-state model to directly build
simple and efficient non-malleable commitments schemes [GPR16].
1.3 Related Work
Since their original formalization, many constructions of NMCs have been proposed, both in
the information-theoretic (e.g., [DPW10, DKO13, ADL14]) and computational (e.g., [LL12,
AAG+16, KLT16]) setting. A number of constructions also aim for additional properties,
such as having efficient refreshing mechanisms that allow to update an existing codeword
to a new one (decoding to the same message) without the need for decoding [FN17]. Some
constructions also specifically focus on computationally restricted adversaries, either in
terms of time or space complexity (e.g., [FHMV17, BDSKM17]).
The construction that is the most relevant to our work is the computationally-secure
split-state NMC by Kiayias et al. [KLT16] from CCS 2016. This NMC features the so far
shortest codeword lengths, given by |m|+ 9τ + 2 log2(τ) or |m|+ 18τ (depending on how
a leakage-resilient authenticated-encryption scheme is instantiated in their construction),
where |m| is the size of the message and τ is the security parameter. One down side
of their scheme is that security is proven under the knowledge of exponent assumption
(KEA), which is considered non-standard because it is not falsifiable [Nao03]. Their scheme
encodes m into (k, r)||(Ek(m),Hz(r, k)) for random k and r, where E is a symmetric
encryption scheme and Hz an instance of a “1-more extractable hash function”. This
can be seen as a refinement of a previous computationally-secure construction from Liu
and Lysyanskaya [LL12] given by Enc : m 7→ sk||(pk, Epk(m), pi), where the symmetric
encryption replaces a public-key scheme and where the hash of the key replaces a NIZK
proof pi of existence of a secret key allowing to invert Epk(·).
1.4 Contribution
We consider and analyze the simplest construction of a computationally secure NMC in
the split-state model based on a block cipher E : {0, 1}κ ×M→M, denoted RKNMC[E ],
where the message m is simply encoded as
Enc : m 7→ k|| Ek(m) , (1)
for a uniformly random key k ∈ {0, 1}κ. This NMC generates short codewords of size |m|+κ
while providing τ = κ/2 bits of security. As such, the construction we consider reduces the
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codeword length down to |m|+ 2τ compared to Kiayias et al.’s scheme. Decoding is done
in the obvious way, and both encoding and decoding are depicted in Figure 1. The goal of
this work is to understand the security of RKNMC[E ] in terms of basic security properties
of the underlying block cipher E .
It is rather obvious that the standard security notion of a block cipher— (strong) pseu-
dorandom permutation security— is insufficient to imply security of this NMC: adversarial
tampering may change the key k used for encryption to any other k′, and in this case
standard (S)PRP security does not offer any guarantee anymore. This is the reason why
previous work (like [KLT16] or [LL12]) end up with more complicated schemes, where the
inclusion of a hash function or NIZK proof thwarts subtle tampering of the encryption
key k.
In this work, we take a different approach: instead of strengthening the construction,
and this way making it more complex and expensive, we show that (1) is secure as long
as the underlying block cipher satisfies certain security properties. Concretely, we give a
characterization of the security of this NMC in terms of basic sufficient security properties
of E : we show that RKNMC[E ] is secure if
(i) E is related-key secure with respect to any single related-key function (Definition 4),
appropriately defined to deal with output-predictable functions such as constant
mappings, and
(ii) E has a graceful degradation in standard PRP security if limited information about
its key is leaked (Definition 3).
Our bound is tight, as we demonstrate with a matching generic attack. It is fair to say
that a violation of either of these properties would be considered a weakness for an actual
block cipher (although some concrete designs do not try to achieve any sort of related-key
security and thus would not fulfill (i)). In that sense, our results show that for any “good”
block cipher E , the construction in (1) is secure. For instance, it seems reasonable to
conjecture that, say, AES-128 [NIS01] or SHACAL-2 [HN01] satisfy (i) and (ii). As generic
attacks w.r.t. to the definitions of (i) and (ii) exist with complexity the square-root of the
keyspace, we thus have obtained a simple and efficient NMC construction that offers 64
(resp. 256) bits of security unless AES-128 (resp. SHACAL-2) exhibits some unexpected
behaviour.
1.5 Discussion
Our NMC significantly improves over the best previous work of Kiayias et al.. We reach
much shorter codewords for any given security level (e.g., 256+ |m| compared to 1250+ |m|
for τ = 128) with an efficient construction that can be readily instantiated. Our security
model also compares favorably as we do not require a non-falsifiable assumption such as
KEA for [KLT16], neither do we need a common reference string (CRS) for initialization
purposes. A comparison of RKNMC with related work is provided in Table 1.
From a symmetric-cryptographic point of view, RKNMC illustrates the relevance of
designing block ciphers meeting strong security requirements, such as resistance to related-
key attacks. Admittedly, constructions benefiting from a related-key secure block cipher
E are already known—one can for instance design a tweakable block cipher E˜ from an
XOR-related-key secure block cipher E as E˜(k, t, ·) = E(k ⊕ t, ·) [LRW11, BK03]—but
often competitive PRP-based alternatives exist. Our non-malleable code construction can
be securely instantiated with a block cipher if it is secure with respect to (i) and (ii) above;
avoiding these conditions imposes the resort to more technical and more expensive schemes,
such as that of Kiayias et al.. This could further motivate the design of related-key secure
block ciphers which can attain non-trivial security with respect to (i). We believe that
designs insecure with respect to (ii) should already be considered insecure in practice, but
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Table 1: Comparison of computationally-secure non-malleable codes in the split-state
tampering model. The data is taken from [KLT16], which also suggested competitive
instantiations of previous schemes. The security parameter is denoted by τ , and the
message length by |m|. CRS stands for common reference string model.
Reference Codeword length CRS Assumption
[ADL14] + [AAG+16] |m|+O(τ7) No authenticated encryption
[LL12] + [GS08] |m|+O(τ2) Yes leakage-resilient PKE + robust NIZK
+ [NS12] + [AAG+16]
[KLT16] |m|+ 9τ + 2 log2(τ) Yes 1-time leakage-resilient AE + KEA
[KLT16] |m|+ 18τ Yes 1-time leakage-resilient AE + KEA
This work |m|+ 2τ No PRP-with-leakage + fixed-related-key
our construction gives a further justification to why this should be the case. This latter
definition might also be useful in different contexts, when a certain notion of resistance to
weak keys needs to be formalized.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation and Basic Definitions
For any finite non-empty set M, Perm(M) is the set of all permutations. We denote
by x $←− X the uniform random sampling of x from X . In our security definitions below,
an adversary A(x) is an algorithm that is given some input x and, in some cases, has
oracle access to a randomized oracle O(b), and eventually outputs a bit bˆ ∈ {0, 1}. The
complexity of A will be controlled by its running time t and the number q of oracle queries
it makes.
We recall the notion of ε-universal hash function families [CW77].
Definition 1 (Universal Hash Function). Let H : {0, 1}κ ×M→ N be a hash function
family. H is called ε-universal if for any distinct x, x′ ∈M and a uniformly random key
k
$←− {0, 1}κ, the probability that H(k, x) = H(k, x′) is smaller than ε. Formally,
∀x, x′ 6= x ∈M, Pr[H(k, x) = H(k, x′) : k $←− {0, 1}κ] ≤ ε .
2.2 (Strong) Non-Malleable Codes
We recall here the formal definition of strong non-malleable codes for split-state tampering
in the computational setting. It states that an adversary should not be able to distinguish
the tampered decoding of two messages m0 and m1 of his choice, except in the trivial
case where tampering has no effect. Indeed, in this degenerate case, it would be easy to
distinguish one from the other. This is formalized through the introduction of a special
“same” symbol that is returned whenever the decoded codeword is equal to the input
message. This special case is consistent with the overall goal of non-malleable codes, as
executing a scheme with its original secret is not per se supposed to leak any information
about it.
Strong non-malleability is further parameterized by the set of tampering functions
allowed to the adversary; in the present case, these are functions that independently act
on the two parts of a codeword.
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Definition 2 (Strong non-malleable code [DPW10] in the split-state tampering model).
Let NMC = (Enc,Dec) be given by an encoding function
Enc : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}`L × {0, 1}`R
and a corresponding decoding function
Dec : {0, 1}`L × {0, 1}`R → {0, 1}n ,
such that Dec(Enc(k,m)) = m for all k and m. For any m and any bipartite function
T = TL‖TR : {0, 1}`L × {0, 1}`R → {0, 1}`L × {0, 1}`R
which maps (cL, cR) 7→ (TL(cL),TR(cR)), we consider the tampering experiment that
chooses k $←− {0, 1}κ and outputs
TampTNMC(m) := D˙ecEnck(m) ◦ T ◦Enck(m) ,
where D˙ecc is a modified decoding algorithm s.t. D˙ecc(c′) = Dec(c′) unless c = c′, in which
case D˙ecc(c′) outputs a special “same” symbol . The SNMC advantage of NMC is then
defined as
Advsnmc-sNMC (t) := max
A,T
max
m0,m1
∣∣Pr[A(TampTNMC(m0)) = 1]− Pr[A(TampTNMC(m1)) = 1]∣∣ ,
where the first max is over all bipartite functions T = TL‖TR that can be computed in time
t and over all algorithms A with running time t, and the second is over all m0,m1 ∈ {0, 1}n.
2.3 Block Ciphers
A block cipher is a mapping E : {0, 1}κ × M → M such that for all k ∈ {0, 1}κ,
Ek(·) := E(k, ·) is invertible. Its inverse is denoted Dk. The classical security models
for block ciphers are “pseudorandom permutation (PRP)” and “strong pseudorandom
permutation (SPRP)” security: the former applies to settings where the adversary can
only learn forward evaluations of the cipher, while in the latter case it may also learn
inverse evaluations. In our work, we will use a slightly tweaked version of PRP security,
see Section 2.3.1. In addition, we will require the block cipher to be related-key secure in a
slightly specialized setting, see Section 2.3.2. For both notions, it is reasonable to believe
that they are satisfied by a “good” block cipher.
2.3.1 PRP Security with Leakage
We consider the following variant of the standard PRP security notion where the adversary
is allowed to learn some information about the key. Since we admit an arbitrary “leakage
function”, we have to be careful to have a definition that is still meaningful, i.e., that cannot
be broken generically. For instance, if the adversary learns the identity function applied
to the key then he can trivially distinguish “real” encryptions from “ideal” encryptions.
Definition 3 (PRP-with-leakage security). Let E : {0, 1}κ ×M→M be a block cipher.
Let ϕ : {0, 1}κ → {0, 1}κ be an arbitrary function, and let Aq,t be an adversary with access
to an oracle Oϕ(b) and which makes at most q queries and operates in at most t time. We
define the PRP-with-leakage advantage of E by:
Advprp-leakE (q, t) = max
Aq,t
max
ϕ
∣∣∣Pr[AOϕ(0)q,t () = 1]− Pr[AOϕ(1)q,t () = 1]∣∣∣ , (2)
where Oϕ(b) acts as follows:
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It chooses a uniformly random key k $←− {0, 1}κ and aborts and answers any query with ⊥
if k is such that ϕ(k) can be guessed with probability at most p ≤ 2−κ/2 (in other words,
if #{k′|ϕ(k′) = ϕ(k)} ≤ 2κ/2 ). Otherwise, it announces ϕ(k) to Aq,t and answers any
encryption query m ∈M with Ek(m) in case b = 0, and with E(m) in case b = 1, where
E
$←− Perm(M) is a uniformly random permutation.
Phrased slightly differently, the oracle Oϕ(b) aborts if the chosen key k happens to
have the property that Pr[ϕ(K)=ϕ(k)] ≤ 2−κ/2 for a uniformly distributed K. As
2−κ = Pr[K=k ] ≥ Pr[K=k ∧ ϕ(K)=k′] = Pr[K=k | ϕ(K)=k′ ] · Pr[ϕ(K)=k′ ]
for every k and k′, this ensures that if k is such that Oϕ(b) does not abort then Pr[K=
k | ϕ(K) = ϕ(k)] ≤ 2−κ/2, i.e., it is still hard to guess k even when given ϕ(k). Thus,
it is meaningful to ask for a small PRP advantage even though we have no restriction
on the leakage function ϕ. Given that the above bound on guessing the key from the
leakage can be met with a suitable choice of ϕ, one may expect that a good cipher achieves
PRP-with-leakage advantage Advprp-leakE (q, t) of about t · 2−κ/2.
Relation With Weak-Key Classes. The security notion of PRP-with-leakage can be
understood as a way of formalizing the requirement that E should not have (many) large
“weak-key classes”. Informally, one may define a weak-key class as a subset Kweak ⊂ {0, 1}κ
of the keyspace of E such that the cipher can be attacked more efficiently (w.r.t. the size
of Kweak) knowing that k ∈ Kweak , that is AdvprpE /Kweak (q, t) t/#Kweak (where E /Kweak
denotes E with its keyspace restricted to Kweak).
The requirement that E has no large weak-key classes would then correspond to the
fact that for any sufficiently large subset K of {0, 1}κ, E with its keyspace restricted to
K is still a “good” PRP w.r.t. the size of K. In other words, the security of E degrades
gracefully when one only considers subsets of its keyspace.
There is a direct relation between this requirement and E being secure w.r.t. PRP-
with-leakage: learning the leakage ϕ(k) restricts k to a subset of the keyspace of size at
least 2κ/2, thence security for any ϕ follows from such a form of weak-key resistance, when
“sufficiently large” is taken to be “larger than 2κ/2”. More explicitly, given any partition
K1 ∪ K2 . . . ∪ Km of {0, 1}κ, one may define an indicator function ϕ such that for any
i, for any k ∈ Ki, ϕ(k) returns a fixed representative of Ki; note that if all the Ki’s are
larger than 2κ/2, the game of Definition 3 never aborts when played with this function.
This lets an adversary obtain “for free” the information of which subspace the key is from.
Yet if E restricted to any of the Ki’s is a good PRP, the adversary still cannot attack
with advantage much better than ≈ t/(mini #Ki) ≤ t/2κ/2, which is the best attainable
security of any cipher w.r.t. Definition 3. On the other hand, if most of the restrictions of
E to Ki result in a “bad” PRP, one may hope to attack with an advantage much larger
than t/2κ/2. As Definition 3 maximizes the adversarial advantage over the choice of ϕ,
good security indeed requires that no such bad partition of the keyspace into many large
weak subspaces exists.
Under this light, we believe that being secure for PRP-with-leakage is in fact a
reasonably standard assumption, as it is common for practitioners to regard a block cipher
as broken if it possesses even only one large weak-key class (see, e.g., [LMR15] for an
example). Smaller classes may be less of a concern as a random key is unlikely to be drawn
from one, and the presence of such classes is indeed allowed in Definition 3.
2.3.2 Fixed-Related-Key Security
We define a notion of related-key security that is sufficient for our purpose of proving
security of the proposed non-malleable code. In comparison to the definition suggested in,
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say, [BK03], our definition is more constrained in that we allow en-/decryption queries
under one related key only (next to the original key), but it is more liberal in that the
related key can be specified by an arbitrary function ϕ, without any restriction (like being
“unpredictable”), while still allowing to attain a meaningful level of security. A consequence
of the latter is that we have to be careful that “real” and “ideal” encryptions are not
trivially distinguishable by a clever choice of ϕ, e.g., a constant function.
Definition 4 (F-RK security1). Let E : {0, 1}κ × M → M be a block cipher, let
ϕ : {0, 1}κ → {0, 1}κ be an arbitrary function, and let Aq,t be an adversary with access to
an oracle Oϕ(b) which makes at most q queries and operates in at most t time. We define
the F-RK advantage of E by:
AdvfrkE (q, t) = max
Aq,t
max
ϕ
∣∣∣Pr[AOϕ(0)q,t () = 1]− Pr[AOϕ(1)q,t () = 1]∣∣∣ , (3)
where Oϕ(b) acts as follows:
It chooses a uniformly random key k $←− {0, 1}κ and aborts and answers ⊥ if ϕ(k) happens to
be a value that can be guessed with probability > 2−κ/2. Otherwise, it proceeds as follows.
If b = 0 then any query of the form (enc, real,m), (enc, modified,m), (dec, real, c) or
(dec, modified, c) is answered with Ek(m), Eϕ(k)(m), Dk(c) and Dϕ(k)(c), respectively,
and if b = 1 then with Ek(m), Eϕ(k)(m), Dk(c) and Dϕ(k)(c), respectively, where Ek and
Eϕ(k) are random and independent permutations from Perm(M) if k 6= ϕ(k), and random
and equal if k = ϕ(k), and Dk and Dϕ(k) are the respective inverses.
We note that in comparison to Definition 3, here the oracle Oϕ(b) aborts if the chosen
key k happens to be so that Pr[ϕ(K) =ϕ(k)] > 2−κ/2 for a uniformly random K. This
ensures that if k is so that Oϕ(b) does not abort then ϕ(k) is hard to guess. Hence, again,
aborting as Oϕ(b) does is necessary (and sufficient) for a meaningful notion of F-RK
security as considered above, where the adversary can ask for en-/decryptions with respect
to any (fixed) function ϕ. Similarly to Definition 3, we may expect AdvfrkE (q, t) ≈ t · 2−κ/2
from a good cipher; in order to achieve a better advantage it is necessary to exploit
structural properties of E .
3 Construction
We now recall our construction and provide some intuition about its soundness, before
presenting the formal security analysis in the next section.
Let E : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a block cipher and D its inverse. We define
RKNMC[E ] as the code with codewords of size κ + n where Enc : m 7→ k|| Ek(m) for a
randomly chosen k $←− {0, 1}κ, and the associated decoding procedure is naturally given by
Dec(cL||cR) 7→ DcL(cR), as illustrated in Figure 1.
3.1 Broken Instantiations
By definition, RKNMC[E ] is functionally a non-malleable code, but the level of security
that it provides highly depends on E . In particular, it is rather easy to see that some
amount of related-key security— if maybe not sufficient— is at least necessary. Indeed,
we can consider the following example: take E to be an Even-Mansour block cipher
[EM91] defined from a public permutation P as Ek(m) = k ⊕P(m⊕ k). In the single-key
setting, Even-Mansour is proven to be secure up to the birthday bound in the ideal
1F-RK stands for fixed related-key and emphasizes that only en-/decryption queries under a fixed
related key are possible. However, as should also be clear from the definition, there is no a priori restriction
on the allowed related-key functions.
344 Short Non-Malleable Codes from Related-Key Secure Block Ciphers
mk
E
cRcL
cRcL
D
m
Figure 1: Non-malleable encoding (left) and decoding (right) with RKNMC[E ].
permutation model [EM91]. However it suffers from a trivial related-key distinguisher,
as Ek⊕∆(m⊕∆) = Ek(m)⊕∆. This directly leads to an attack on RKNMC[E ]: if we let
TL = TR : x 7→ x⊕∆ for some ∆, then
TampTRKNMC(m) = DTL(k) ◦TR ◦ Ek(m) = Dk⊕∆(Ek(m)⊕∆) = m⊕∆ ,
which is strongly related to m (by having a fixed difference ∆), and so the original message
can be easily recovered.
3.2 Proof Idea
While the above might seem worrying, it crucially exploits related-key weaknesses of E . We
now provide some intuition why resisting related-key attacks is in fact (mostly) sufficient
to obtain a secure non-malleable code.
First, one can notice that the decoding DTL(k)(TR(Ek(m))) of a tampered codeword
can be obtained by means of a couple of related-key en-/decryption queries. It follows
that distinguishing such a tampered codeword from a random uncorrelated one enables
to distinguish the “real” from the “ideal” oracle in the related-key security game from
Definition 4, assuming that the oracle there does not abort and thus provides the necessary
en- and decryptions. With this observation, we already get security of RKNMC[E ] for
choices of TL for which TL(k) is an unlikely value (except with small probability), i.e.,
for tampering functions TL that are output-unpredictable using the terminology of [BK03].
Unfortunately, it is crucial for the security notion in Definition 4 to make sense to have
the oracle abort as soon as TL(k) becomes predictable. This is because the adversary can
trivially distinguish a real encryption from an ideal encryption under a predictable key
TL(k), for instance if TL : k 7→ k0 for a constant k0, because then it can compute the real
encryption himself.
On the other hand, for such an extreme choice of a constant tampering function, where
the reduction to related-key security fails (because the oracle in Definition 4 aborts), we
see that it actually does not harm NMC security. Indeed, in this case, DTL(k)(TR(Ek(m)))
can be computed with the help of a standard encryption query only (since the decryption
with the publicly-known key TL(k) = k0 can be done without any oracle query), and so
the security of RKNMC[E ] for such a function follows from standard PRP security.
A similar argument can be used even if TL is not constant, but still has a sufficiently
small image. For instance, assume that it takes possible values {k0, k1, . . . , km}, such
that every corresponding preimage Ki := TL−1({ki}) is still large (say at least 2κ/2), so
that k remains hard to guess even when given TL(k). Then, the security of RKNMC[E ]
can be obtained by assuming that the PRP security of E degrades gracefully when its
keyspace is restricted to any Ki. In other words, security of RKNMC[E ] then reduces to
PRP-with-leakage security as in Definition 3.
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To prove the security of RKNMC[E ] in full generality without any restriction on TL,
one has to combine the two above reductions. This can be done by splitting the keyspace
{0, 1}κ of E into two parts, depending on whether TL(k) is an unlikely value or not, and
by observing that in each case, either the oracle in the security game of Definition 3 or the
oracle in the security game of Definition 4 does not abort, and so we can do the security
reduction to the corresponding security property.
Overall, this strategy allows us to show that for a well-chosen E , RKNMC[E ] has τ = κ/2
bits of security.
4 Proof of the Construction
Recall that in the NMC security game, the decoding is done by means of a “tweaked”
decoder D˙ec(c) that outputs  in case its input c′ is equal to c, i.e., no tampering took
place.
Theorem 1. Let E : {0, 1}κ ×M → M be a block cipher. If the hash function family
H :M×{0, 1}κ →M defined by H(k, x) = Ex(k) is ε-universal, then the construction of
Section 3 is a non-malleable code with:
Advsnmc-sRKNMC(t) ≤ 2 max
{
Advprp-leakE (1, 2t+ τD) + 2−κ/2,Adv
frk
E (4, 2t) + ε+ 2−n
}
,
where τD is the time complexity of D.
Proof. Let T = TL ‖TR be a bipartite tampering function that can be computed in time
t, and let A be an algorithm with running time t. We need to show that the output
of A(TampTRKNMC(m)) is almost independent of m. Let K be uniformly distributed over
{0, 1}κ, and let Λ be the event that
K ∈ {k ∣∣ Pr[TL(K) = TL(k)] ≤ 2−κ/2 } ,
i.e., the event that “TL(K) is an unlikely value”. We point out that Λ is the event for which
OTL aborts in the security game of Definition 3 when queried on the function ϕ = TL, and
it is also the event for which OTL does not abort in the security game of Definition 4. We
observe that
Pr
[
TL(K)=k′ ∧ Λ
] ≤ 2−κ/2 (4)
and
Pr
[
K=k ∧ ¬Λ ∣∣ TL(K)=k′ ] ≤ 2−κ/2 (5)
for all k and k′; the former is by definition of Λ and the latter follows from
2−κ = Pr[K=k ] ≥ Pr[K=k ∧ TL(K)=k′ ∧ ¬Λ ]
≥ Pr[K=k ∧ ¬Λ | TL(K)=k′ ] · Pr[ TL(K)=k′ ]
≥ Pr[K=k ∧ ¬Λ | TL(K)=k′ ] · 2−κ/2 ,
where the last inequality is by observing that if k′ is such that Pr[ TL(K)=k′ ] ≤ 2−κ/2
then Pr[K=k ∧ ¬Λ | TL(K)=k′ ] = 0 by the definition of Λ. Furthermore, by considering
(5) and setting k′ = k, multiplying with Pr[TL(K)=k], and summing over k, we get that
Pr
[
TL(K)=K ∧ ¬Λ
] ≤ 2−κ/2 . (6)
We extend the notation of D˙ec to D and write D˙k,ck′ (c′) for the standard decryption but
with the decrypted message replaced by  in case k′ = k and c′ = c. Then, for the case
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that the event Λ does not occur, we can argue as follows for any fixed choice of m:
Pr[A(TampTRKNMC(m)) = 1 ∧ ¬Λ]
= Pr
[
A ◦ D˙ecEncK(m) ◦ T ◦EncK(m) = 1 ∧ ¬Λ
]
= Pr
[
A ◦ D˙K,EK(m)TL(K) ◦ TR ◦ EK(m) = 1 ∧ ¬Λ
]
(by construction)
= Pr
[
A ◦ DTL(K) ◦TR ◦ EK(m) = 1 ∧ ¬Λ
]
± 2−κ/2 (by (6))
= Pr
[
A ◦ DTL(K) ◦TR ◦ E(m) = 1 ∧ ¬Λ
]
±Advprp-leakE (1, 2t+ τD)± 2−κ/2 ,
where E $←− Perm(M) is a random permutation. This last approximation is by the PRP-
with-leakage security by considering the leakage function TL and the adversary that
outputs 1 if OTL aborts and, if it receives k′ instead, queries OTL on m to get c and then
outputs A ◦ Dk′ ◦TR(c). Given that ¬Λ coincides with the event that OTL does not abort
in the PRP-with-leakage security game, this shows that the two probabilities indeed differ
by at most Advprp-leakE (1, 2t+ τD). The derived probability above is obviously independent
of the choice of m, because E(m) is uniformly random and independent of K, no matter
what m is.
To argue for the case Λ, we set K ′ := TL(K) as a short hand, we let M˜ be a uniformly
random message in M independent from m, and we write D¨c˜,c˜′,ck′ (c′) for the standard
decryption but with the message replaced by  in case c˜ = c˜′ and c′ = c. We get that:
Pr[A(TampTRKNMC(m)) = 1 ∧ Λ]
= Pr
[
A ◦ D˙ecEncK(m) ◦ T ◦EncK(m) = 1 ∧ Λ
]
= Pr
[
A ◦ D˙K,EK(m)K′ ◦ TR ◦ EK(m) = 1 ∧ Λ
]
(by construction)
= Pr
[
A ◦ D¨EK(M˜),EK′ (M˜),EK(m)K′ ◦ TR ◦ EK(m) = 1 ∧ Λ
]
± ε (by Definition 1)
= Pr
[
A ◦ D¨EK(M˜),EK′ (M˜),EK(m)K′ ◦ TR ◦EK(m) = 1 ∧ Λ
]
±AdvfrkE (4, 2t)± ε ,
where the last approximation is by F-RK security. Concretely, it follows by considering
the function TL and the adversary that outputs 1 if OTL aborts and otherwise acts as
follows. First, it queries the oracle on (enc, real,m) to obtain c and on (enc, real, m˜)
and (enc, modified, m˜) for a random m˜ to obtain c˜ and c˜′, respectively. Then, if c˜ = c˜′
and TR(c) = c, it runs A on input  and outputs whatever A outputs. Otherwise, it
queries the oracle on (dec, modified,TR(c)) and runs A on the reply m′ that the oracle
provides, and outputs whatever A outputs. Given that Λ coincides with the event that
OTL does not abort in the F-RK security game, this shows that the two probabilities differ
by at most AdvfrkE (4, 2t).
Here, the derived probability is almost independent of the choice of m. The only
dependency occurs in the event that K = K ′ and TR ◦EK(m) 6= EK(m), in which case
D¨K′ decrypts to a random message distinct from m, but this is 2−n-close from a random
message that may include m.
Finally, given that the event Λ is independent of the choice of m, by basic properties
of the statistical distance we get that the distributions of A ◦ TampTRKNMC(m0) and A ◦
TampTRKNMC(m1) are close as claimed.
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5 A Matching Generic Attack
If E is an ideal cipher, it satisfies (see the remarks after Definitions 3 and 4)
AdvfrkE (q, t) ≈ Advprp-leakE (q, t) ≈ t/2κ/2 ,
where we equate the time complexity with the number of primitive queries, and the bound
of Theorem 1 is in O(t/2κ/2). We sketch a generic attack for RKNMC instantiated with a
block cipher E : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. If κ ≤ n, n a constant, the attack succeeds
with probability Ω(t2/2κ), closely matching the bound of the theorem (for large values of
t) if E is frk- and prp-leak-secure.
Consider an adversary for the game of Definition 2, which is given two distinct message
m0 and m1 and the tampering functions
TL : x = xκ−1xκ−2 . . . x0 7→ 0κ/2xκ/2−1 . . . x0 ,
TR : x = xn−1xn−2 . . . x0 7→ 0n/2xn/2−1 . . . x0 ,
where 0α denotes a string of α zeros. That is, both tampering functions overwrite the left
half of their inputs with zeros. The adversary is then given the tampered decoding
c = Dec ◦T ◦Enck(mb) = DTL(k)(TR(Ek(mb))) ,
where k $←− {0, 1}κ and b $←− {0, 1}; we assume here that TR(Ek(m0)) 6= TR(Ek(m1)), which
is true with probability close to 2−n/2.
The idea of the attack is to use a meet-in-the-middle approach that allows to separately
retrieve the two halves of the randomness. The adversary first zeroes the upper bits of k
using TL, re-encrypts c with candidate values for its lower bits, and only keeps the ones
that lead to observing a distinguishing condition on TR(Ek(mb)), i.e., that the upper bits
of the re-encryption must be zero. Remaining candidate values for k are then completed
in their upper bits and used to tentatively encode both of m0 and m1; a match with
TR(Ek(mb)) suggests a full candidate that may be used to answer the challenge. This
procedure is detailed in Algorithm 1, with the main steps described below.
At the end of the loop on lines 3–8, the set ∆ includes the “right” pair (TR(Ek(mb)),
TL(k)), along with an expected number w := 2κ/2/2n/2 of false positives. The loop on lines
9–20 is executed at most w + 1 times, and each execution takes at most 2κ/2 executions of
the inner-loop of lines 10–19. For each pair (d, k) that is not the right one, the expected
number of successful tests on lines 12 and 16 is 2κ/2/2n/2 each. This is the same for the
right pair, plus an additional successful test for the correct value of b. All in all, the
attack succeeds if and only if the tampered decodings of m0 and m1 did not collide in
the first place and if there was no false positive on line 12 or 16, that is with probability
approximately (
1− 2−n/2
)
·
(
1
1 + 2κ/22n/2
)2
.
If κ ≤ n, this success probability is Ω(1) (when fixing n to a constant).
The attack can also be run with fewer than ≈ 2κ/2 steps, decreasing its success
probability accordingly. If the loop 3–8 is interrupted after at most t iterations, then the
probability that the right pair was found is t/2κ/2. Assuming a negligible number of false
positive for simplicity (i.e., assuming κ ≤ n), if the loop of lines 10–19 is again interrupted
after at most t iterations, the algorithm returns a correct answer with probability t/2κ/2.
The advantage of such a 2t-restricted adversary is thus Ω(t2/2κ), which is consistent with
a meet-in-the-middle attack such as this one.
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1 begin
2 ∆ := ∅
3 for ki := 0κ/2||[i]2, i < 2κ/2 do . [x]2 is the binary representation of x.
4 di := Eki(c)
5 if di has its n/2 leftmost bits equal to zero then
6 ∆ := ∆ ∪ (di, ki)
7 end
8 end
9 forall (d, k) ∈ ∆ do
10 forall kj s.t. TL(kj) = k do
11 ej,0 := TR(Ekj (m0))
12 if ej,0 = d then
13 return 0
14 end
15 ej,1 := TR(Ekj (m1))
16 if ej,1 = d then
17 return 1
18 end
19 end
20 end
21 return 0
22 end
Algorithm 1: A generic attack for RKNMC.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this work, we considered the simplest construction of an NMC from a block cipher E ,
and we characterized its security by means of formulating and proving sufficient security
conditions on E . Since these require some form of related-key security, it is then natural
to wonder how reasonable such an assumption is and how it could be instantiated in
practice. A first line of approach is to consider existing block ciphers. There is good
empirical evidence that e.g. the NIST standard AES-128 [NIS01] and the NESSIE cipher
SHACAL-2 [HN01] are both secure against related-key attacks; this yields immediate
candidates for explicit instantiations targeting 64 and 256 bits of security respectively.
From a more theoretical point of view, Farshim and Procter [FP15] and, independently,
Cogliati and Seurin [CS15] showed that a 3-round iterated Even-Mansour construction
with identical keys is provably secure against attacks under the related-key class Φ⊕ :=
{x 7→ x⊕∆ |∆ ∈ {0, 1}|x|}. Although this result focuses on a single related-key class, it is
significant insofar as it shows that a non-trivial level of related-key security can be achieved
by a very simple construction. Furthermore, no attack exploiting a different related-key
class is currently known for this construction.
Overall, there is good empirical and theoretical evidence that related-key security is
achievable for block ciphers, and our non-malleable code could thus easily and immediately
be instantiated by existing schemes.
Finally, while the construction and its analysis in Section 4 center around a simple
fixed-input-length block cipher, we conclude with the observation that the approach and
our result naturally extends to using variable-input-length block ciphers (VILBC). A
VILBC is a family of block ciphers E` : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}` → {0, 1}` indexed by a block size
parameter ` ∈ S, where S is a predetermined set (e.g., S = [n,∞[). The security of the
VILBC E is defined as the minimum security reached for any (valid) choice of the length
parameter, and the security models of Section 2.3 straightforwardly generalize.
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Given a secure VILBC E , the NMC of Section 3 generalizes to messages m whose
length is at most |m| ≤ max S as follows: injectively pad m to m∗ such that ` = |m∗| is a
valid size parameter for E (i.e., ` ∈ S), and return k|| E`k(m∗). Because E` for fixed ` is a
fixed-input-length block cipher, the analysis of Section 4 carries over and ensures that this
is a secure encoding of m∗, and thus of m.
Many constructions of VILBC have been proposed in the literature, see, e.g., [NR99,
BR99]; concrete instantiations of such primitives have also been designed, e.g., [HKR15,
BDP+14]. Not all of these constructions natively achieve related-key security. Yet, at the
cost of some overhead, related-key security can be achieved with some level of provable
security, for instance by using the VILBC as a permutation within a related-key-secure
Even-Mansour construction.
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